Abstract-Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen, require a verifier to interact with the signer to verify a signature, and hence allow the signer to control the verifiability of his signatures. Convertible undeniable signatures allow the signer to convert undeniable signatures into ordinary signatures. In this paper we propose some extended variants of the famous DiffieHellman assumption on bilinear group system, then design a new convertible undeniable signature scheme and provide proofs for all relevant security properties based on the new assumption in the random oracle model. The advantages of our scheme are the short length of the signatures, the low computational cost of the signature, the receipt generation and the provable security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The two most important properties of ordinary digital signatures are nonrepudiation and universal verifiability. Non-repudiation guarantees that a signer cannot deny his or her commitment to a message or a contract at a later time, and the property of universal verifiability allows everybody to check the correctness of a signature. For privacy reasons, it is preferable, in many applications, that the verification of signatures be controlled or (at least) limited by the signer. Therefore, the concept of undeniable signatures was introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [1] . In this setting, the verification (and the denial) of a signature requires the cooperation of the signer. And non-repudiation is still guaranteed, since the signer cannot convince the verifier that a correct signature is invalid or that an incorrect signature is valid.
The security of the protocol in [1] relies on the discrete logarithm problem, but suffers from the fact that the This work is partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61202475) and Humanities and Social Science Research Project of the Ministry of Education (11YJCZH039). Corresponding Author, Fei Li. interactive protocols were not zero-knowledge. One year later, Chaum improved significantly the initial proposal by providing a zero-knowledge version in [2] . In 1991, the concept has been refined by giving the possibility to transform an undeniable signature into a self-authenticating signature. These convertible undeniable signatures, proposed in [3] by Boyar, Chaum, Damgard and Pedersen, provide individual and universal conversions of the signatures. Unfortunately, this ElGamal like scheme has been broken in 1996 by Michels, Petersen, and Horster [5] who proposed a repaired version with heuristic security. Since then, many schemes have then been proposed, based upon classical signatures, such as Schnorr [6] , ElGamal [7] and RSA [8] - [10] . In 2004, Monnerat and Vaudenay [11] proposed short undeniable signatures based on the computation of characters which do not provide the conversion property. In 2005, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [12] presented a new efficient convertible undeniable signature scheme based on bilinear maps. Its unforgeability is tightly related, in the random oracle model, to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem and its anonymity to a non-standard decisional assumption. Convertible undeniable signatures have given rise to many applications in cryptography [3] , [13] , [14] . In 2006, Kurosawa and Takagi [15] proposed a new approach for selectively convertible undeniable signature Schemes, and presented two efficient schemes based on RSA. In 2007, Yue et al. [16] constructed a new convertible signature without random oracles based Waters signature scheme. In 2008, Aimani et al. [17] gave two specific approaches for building universally convertible undeniable signatures from a large class of pairing-based signatures. In 2009, Huang and Wong [18] proposed a new efficient construction of fully functional convertible undeniable signature, which supports both selective conversion and universal conversion, and is immune to the claimability attacks. In 2010, Phong et al. [19] proposed two convertible undeniable signature schemes satisfying anonymity in the standard model. In 2010, Kikuchi et al. [20] proposed a framework for constructing convertible undeniable signatures from weakly-secure standard signatures, and presented a concrete instantiation employing a standard signature scheme proposed at Eurocrypt'09. In 2011, Schuldt and Matsuura [21] presented an updated definition and security model for schemes allowing delegation, and highlight a new essential security property, token soundness and proposed a new convertible undeniable signature scheme satisfying this security. In 2012, Zhao and Ye [22] proposed a certificateless undeniable signature scheme based on bilinear maps.
From the above survey, it is obvious that the designing of provably secure convertible undeniable signature scheme with high efficiency and short length has been a cryptographic task full of challenge. Motivated by this challenge, we propose a new convertible undeniable signature scheme which can be seen as the natural extension of the BLS short signature scheme [23] and the undeniable signature in [1] . Like the convertible undeniable signature scheme in [12] , our scheme also use nonstandard computational number theory assumption relative to the so-called xyz-Diffie-Hellman problem. However, our generalization and extension of the Diffie-Hellman assumption on bilinear groups seems more natural and the resulting convertible undeniable scheme is more compatible to the atomic digital signature (BLS short signature) and more efficient in computation and size. Additionally, our proving technique is also different from that of [12] . In all, our scheme has the following advantages over its counterparts : short length, computational efficiency, both universally and individually convertibility, and provable security in the random oracle model [24] .
The rest is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some mathematical background including bilinear maps, the number-theoretic problems underlying our scheme and designated-verifier noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system. Specially, we gradually extend the famous Diffie-Hellman assumption to a new but less standard one -one-more tripartite-Diffie-Hellman problem -for the provable security. We recall the formalization of convertible undeniable signature scheme and its security model in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our new convertible undeniable signature scheme. And then we prove its security in the random oracle model in Section 5. At last, we give the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARY

A. Bilinear Map
Recently, bilinear pairings have found various applications in cryptography and have allowed us to construct many new cryptographic schemes [25] - [28] . Our convertible undeniable signature scheme are also based on such generally applied cryptographic primitive -bilinear map. We now recall some definition relative to the bilinear group systems.
Definition 1. (Bilinear group system). A bilinear group system is a tuple
where q is a prime number, G 1 , G 2 , G T are groups of order q with efficiently computable inner laws, 
B. Computational Problems in Bilinear Group Systems
We now give the description of some complexity assumptions.
The designing of our new undeniable signature is mainly based upon the observation on the above pair of problems (CCTDH and DCTDH) which just correspond to the authenticity and the privacy of our scheme. However, for provable security of our scheme, we need more formal and stronger assumption than the above "naked" ones. In [12] , the so-called xyz-Diffie-Hellman (computational and decisional) problems similar to the above problems are proposed. They discussed the corresponding assumptions and proposed a new protocol of undeniable signature according to the similar idea to us. However, in this paper, we propose a seemingly more common extension of DCTDH and hence get more efficient, more compact and shorter undeniable signature.
For provable security of some cryptographic primitives and more efficiency, we often turn to some stronger assumption. The "one-more" variants of some standard assumption have been applied to prove the security of many cryptographic primitives which have only heuristic security before. For example, these one-more variants, including one-more RSA, one-more discrete logarithm, one-more Diffie-Hellman, have been used to prove the security of a series of transitive signature schemes [29] and identification schemes [30] . So we can see that onemore variants of some standard assumption are becoming very natural extension and forceful cryptographic tools in the field of provable security. Similarly, to attain the provable security (here the invisibility) instead of heuristic security and more efficiency, we naturally extend the above DCTDH assumption to the one-more variant formally defined as follows. ; otherwise, it first selects a random point V ∈ G 1 and then return (V, V ) with V = xyV .
be the number of queries A made to the target (resp. helper) oracles. The advantage of the adversary attacking 1m-DCTDH is defined as
where Adv 0 is defined as the probability of A to output a set W of, say, l tuples
The
1m-DCTDH assumption states that there is no polynomial-time adversary A with non-negligible Adv
Informally, the above assumption states that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary without the secret keys to present all right answers to even 1 more random challenges (whether a target output (V, V ) satisfies V = xyV ) than the times of the accesses to the helper oracle.
C. Proof of equality or inequality of two discrete logarithms
Let (G, +) and (H, ·) be two groups of the same prime order q and let P and g be generators of G and H (respectively). What we need in this paper are the noninteractive proof of equality (resp. inequality) of the discrete logarithm of Y ∈ G in base P and the one of y ∈ H in base g denoted by NIP K(a :
In [33] , two efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge (in the random oracle model) proof systems of equality and inequality of two discrete logarithms are presented where G = H. However, it is trivial to extend both protocols to the more general case of G = H.
In general, a 3-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) protocol can be transformed to a more efficient noninteractive protocol by using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [4] . Such noninteractive protocols for proof of equality or inequality of two discrete logarithms are as follows [33] (H is abused to denote some random oracle corresponding to the context and note that if the oracle H can be controlled, the valid transcript can be simulated for any pair (y, Y )):
To overcome universal verifiability of the above protocols, designated-verifier technique was introduced in [32] by Jakobsson et al. In a designated-verifier confirmation proof, the signer proves that "NIP K(a : y = g a Y = aP )" or "he knows the verifier's secret key". In other words, the verifier is able to produce such a valid proof himself using his secret key. By using the designatedverifier technique, one can thereby prevent illegal copies of the proof. Using the technique shown in [34] , a designated-verifier proof can be constructed for a publicsecret key pair of any well-known public key system. The obtained NIPK proof is zero-knowledge in the random oracle model. And we denote such designated-verifier variants of the above two protocols as
We do not give the concrete NIZK designated-verifier confirmation and disavowal protocols since different protocols are associated with different public key systems used by the verifier.
III. FORMAL DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we follow [12] to present the formal definition and security model for convertible undeniable signature schemes. 
A. Definition
B. Security model
In the following definition, we assume that the adversary (A or D) is allowed to query a receipt generating oracle Υ and a confirming/denying oracle Ξ on any couple message/ signature of his choice, in addition to the classical access to the signing oracle Σ and to the random oracle H. For more description, we refer reader to [12] . For one standard signature scheme, the adaptive chosenmessage attack is the most powerful attack possible for an enemy who is restricted to using the signature scheme in a natural manner. The following definition 5 for CUS signatures is one variant of the chosen message attack for the standard signatures. 
Definition 5 (Unforgability [12]). Let CUS be a convertible undeniable signature scheme and let A be an EF-CMA-adversary against CUS. We consider the following random experiment, where k is a security parameter:
params R ← − CUS.Setup(k), (pk, sk) R ← − CUS.KeyGen(params) (m * , σ * ) ← A H,Σ,Υ,Ξ (params, pk), Return b ← CU S.U V erif y(params, pk, m * , σ * , I)
We define the success of the adversary A, via Suc cef −cma
CUS,A (k) = P r[b = "valid"]. (Note that it is trivial to require that Σ is not queried on m * ). Given k ∈ N and ∈ [0, 1], the scheme CUS is said to be -EF-CMA secure, if no EF-CMA-adversary A has a success probability Suc cef −cma
CUS,A (k) ≥ (k). Definition 6 (Invisibility [12]). Let CUS be a convertible undeniable signature scheme and let D be an Inv-CMA-adversary against CUS. We consider the following random experiment, where k is a security parameter:
params R ← − CUS.Setup(k), (pk, sk) R ← − CUS.KeyGen(params) m * R ← − D H,Σ,Υ,Ξ (params, pk), b R ← − {0, 1} If b = 1, σ * ← CU S.Sign(sk, m * ), else σ * R ← − S
The distinguisher D wins the game if b = b. D's advantage in this game is defined to be Adv
Given k ∈ N and ∈ [0, 1], the scheme CUS is said to be -Inv-CMA secure, if no Inv-CMA-adversary D has a success Adv
Inv−cma CUS,D (k) ≥ (k)
IV. NEW CONVERTIBLE UNDENIABLE SIGNATURE SCHEME In this section, we present a new convertible undeniable signature scheme based on bilinear paring. This scheme consists of the following polynomial time algorithms.
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter, BGSG be a bilinear group system generator and param = (q,
* → G 1 be a cryptographic hash function. And let H be another cryptographic hash function which will be used in FiatShamir transformation for constructing designatedverifier noninteractive zero knowledge protocols of Confirming/denying in the later.
• KeyGen: Alice picks randomly two integers x, y ∈ Z * q and computes the points X = xP 2 and Y = yP 2 . Alice's public key is the pair (X, Y ) and her secret key is (x, y).
• Sign: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , Alice computes the undeniable signature σ = xyH(m).
• Confirm / Deny: Given a message m and a signature σ, Alice can confirm or deny σ with the following designated-verifier noninteractive zeroknowledge proof of knowledge:
• IReceipt: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a putative signature σ on m, Alice computes the point σ 2 = yH(m) ∈ G 1 . The individual receipt with respect to σ is σ 2 .
• IVerify: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , a putative signature σ on m and a putative individual receipt σ 2 on σ, the validity of the receipt is decided by checking whether e(σ 2 , P 2 ) = e(H(m), Y ) or not. If σ 2 is valid, then the validity of σ is decided by checking whether e(σ, P 2 ) = e(σ 2 , X) or not.
• UReceipt: Alice publishes the point I = xyP 2 .
• UVerify: The validity of the universal receipt I is decided by verifying that e
(ψ(X), Y ) = e(ψ(I), P 2 ).
If it is valid, given a signature σ on a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and I, everyone checks the validity of this signature by verifying that e(σ, P 2 ) = e (H(m), I ). Efficiency considerations. Compared with other convertible undeniable signature schemes, our scheme has a number of advantages. As a natural extension of the shortest signature scheme BLS signature [23] , our signature scheme inherited the shortest length and only consists in an element of G 1 . Therefore, the size of the signature is only 160 bits. Furthermore, a receipt (individual and universal) is also an element of G 2 or G 1 . From an efficiency point of view, the signature generation and the individual and universal receipts generation algorithms require only one exponentiation as the most expensive operation. Unfortunately, it turns out that the signature verification is slightly more time consuming, as it requires some pairing evaluations.
V. SECURITY PROOF
Since the protocols of confirmation and denying are designated-verifier noninteractive zero-knowledge, it is obvious that our convertible undeniable signature satisfies the completeness, soundness and non-transferability. Now, it remains to prove the security of unforgeability and invisibility.
On one hand our convertible undeniable signature scheme is more efficient, shorter than the state-of-theart convertible undeniable signature in [12] . On the other hand, our proving technique is also different from that of them. With respect to the proving of unforgeability, the different technique makes us to avoid the random salt in the scheme at the price of a slightly less reduction efficiency. When it comes to the proving of invisibility, our reduction between invisibility and the 1m-DCTCD is perfect and our method to extend the standard assumption are more commonly used in literature.
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability). The new convertible undeniable scheme is EF-CMA-secure in the random oracle model if the Co-CDH problem is hard.
Proof. In this proof, we will follow the security proof [33] which deals with the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme, since our scheme also use the full domain hash function (FDH) as the random oracle.
We assume implicitly that all parties have access to the public parameter param
* → G 1 to be a cryptographic hash function. Assume H to be another cryptographic hash function which are used in designated-verifier NIZK protocols of confirming/denying and not explicitly mentioned in above description of our scheme for simplicity. And note that by manipulating the random oracle H , a valid transcript of the NIZK proof can be easily simulated.
First, if there exists a forger F who can forge a signature with advantage F , then we will construct an algorithm M which can solve the Co-CDH problem with advantage M , with F as a subroutine. Assueme the input to M is (X, R) where X = xP 2 , R = rP 1 . M then runs F by giving F with the public key (X, Y (= yP 2 )) and (H, H ) where H and H are random oracles that will be simulated by M and y ∈ R Z q is chosen and held by M . M simulates the signing oracle Σ, receipt generating oracle Υ and the confirmation/disavowal Ξ oracle itself. Let q S and q H denote the number of signing queries and H queries that F issues respectively. Assume that when F requests a signature on a message m i , it has already made the corresponding H query on m i .
When F request H(m i ), M answers R i = H(m i ) = α i P 1 with probability δ and R i = H(m i ) = α i R with probability 1 − δ, where α i is random in Z q and δ is a fixed probability to be determined later.
When F makes a Υ-query for some pair of (m i , σ i ), M can successfully return the universal receipt xyP 2 or the individual receipt yH(m i ) since M holds the partial secret key y.
Suppose that F makes a signing query for a message m i . If M has responded with R i = α i P 1 to the H query for a message m i , then M returns σ i = (y · α i )ψ(X) as the valid signature. Otherwise, M aborts and it fails to solve the Co-CDH problem.
When F makes a H -query for a new str, where str is the string that F would like to know its H value, M always responds with a random number. In fact, M assigns some values to H (str) for some str such that he can simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle Ξ. When F makes a H -query for such str, M returns H (str) to F .
Next, we consider the case when F makes a confimation/disavowal query. Let q v be the number of queries that F issues to the confirmation/disavowal oracle. For convenience, we consider that the final output of F is the (q v + 1)-th query (i.e. the forged signature pair (m * , σ * ). We say that (m i , σ i ) is special if it is a valid messagesignature pair queried by F to the confirmation/disavowal oracle such that m i has never been queried to the signing oracle. M guesses the first special query. More precisely, M guesses the first i such that the i-th query (m i , σ i ) is special. So, at the beginning, M chooses Guess ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q v + 1} randomly. There are two cases to be considered here, namely, i < Guess and i = Guess. First suppose that i < Guess.
• If F has never made a signing query for m i , then M returns "no" and the transcript of the disavowal protocol.
• Otherwise, F has already made a signing query for m i , and M answered with a valid signature σ i with probability δ (with probability (1 − δ), M aborts). If σ i = σ i then M returns "yes" and the transcript of the confirmation protocol. Otherwise, M returns "no" and the transcript of the disavowal protocol. As mentioned before, M can manipulate the H -oracle and thus it can generate a transcript of the confirmation or disavowal protocol. Now suppose that i = Guess. Let (m * , σ * ) be the i-th query. If F has queried m * to the signing oracle, then M aborts. Otherwise, we assume that F has queried the H oracle on m * and so m * = m j for some j. If V j = H(m * ) = α j R, then we have σ * = xyV j = (xyα j )R. Consequently, M outputs xR since he knows α j , y, where y is the partial secret key held by M and y is the parameter chosen and stored by M during the simulation of the random oracle H. Hence, M can solve the Co-CDH problem. Otherwise, M aborts and it fails to solve the Co-CDH problem.
Now it remains to compute the probability that M does not abort. M guesses the first special query with probability 1/(q v + 1). M answers to all the signing queries with property δ qS and M outputs xR with probability 1−δ. Hence, the probability that M does not abort during the simulation is δ
Here, e is the natural logarithm base. In fact, the value (1−1/(q S +1)) qS approaches 1/e for large q S . Proof. For simplicity, we assume implicitly that all parties can access to the public parameter param = (q, P 1 , P 2 , g T , G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, ψ) . Let H : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a cryptographic hash function. And let H be another cryptographic hash function which will be used in the protocols of confirming/denying. And note that by manipulating the the random oracle H , a valid transcript of the designated NIZK proof can be easily simulated.
Theorem 2 (Invisibility
We At last, we show how to simulate the confirmation/disavowal oracle. Suppose that 1m-DCTDH problem is hard. Then D cannot forge with non-negligible probability because forgery is equivalent to Co-CDH problem from above theorem. Now assume that D queries (m i , σ i ) to the confirmation/disavowal oracle.
• If D has never made a signing query for m i , then D returns "no" and a transcript of the disavowal protocol. This is justified because D cannot forge as mentioned above.
• Otherwise, D has already made a signing query for m i , and D has answered with a valid signature σ i . If σ i = σ i then D returns "yes" and a transcript of the confirmation protocol. Otherwise, D returns "no" and a transcript of the disavowal protocol. D can generate a transcript of the confirmation/disavowal protocol as shown in since he can control the random oracle of H which is used in the NIZK proof systemsconfirmation/denial protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first propose computational and decisional Co-tripartite-Diffie-Hellman assumptions and extend the decisional tripartite-Diffie-Hellman assumption to the one-more variant based on the bilinear group system. Then we designed a new short convertible undeniable signature scheme which is proven to be secure under the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman (unforgeable) and one-more decisional tripartite-Diffie-Hellman (invisible). This new convertible undeniable signature is based on the most popular short signature from pairing, and specially suitable some resource restricted settings such as smartcard.
